Christian Psychology
5
Theistic Psychology and the Relation of Worldviews:
A Reply to the Critics
Jeffrey S. Reber and Brent D. Slife
Brigham Young University
Prompted by recent critical commentary on theistic psychology and psychotherapy, this paper examines the conven-
tional frame of theism and naturalism—as separable and hierarchical worldviews—that is typically implied by
critics of theistic psychology. Using Daniel Helminiak’s (2010) critique of theistic psychology and psychotherapy as
our exemplar, we show how this conventional frame rests upon an assumed dualism that portrays naturalism as the
superior worldview to theism for science because of its assumed greater objectivity and theism’s assumed greater sub-
jectivity. Closely following the philosophy of science and social science literature we challenge this dualistic approach
to relating these two major worldviews of Western civilization, and show that naturalism is as capable of subjectiv-
ity and thus bias, dogmatism, and fragmentation as theism or any other worldview. We discuss how this leveling of
worldviews does not threaten psychology with epistemological relativism, as some critics assert, because it assumes a
non-dualistic ontology in which the subject/object dualism that gives rise to relativism is not presupposed. We close
by discussing how this alternative framing of the relation between worldviews allows for a pluralism of worldviews,
including a theistic worldview, to guide the advancement of psychological science.
Keywords: worldviews, relationality, naturalism, theism, hermeneutic realism
Dialogue on Christian Psychology: Discussion Article
I
n recent years, a theistic approach to psychol-
ogy has received increased attention. Indeed, the
editors of three different journals, the
Journal of
Psychology & Theology
, the
Journal of Theoretical
and Philosophical Psychology
, and
Research in the Social
Scientific Study of Religion
, have each published a special
issue of their periodical on the topic of a theistic ap-
proach to psychology within the last five years. Each
journal issue features articles that assert the value of this
approach to the discipline along with several critical
responses. We find these critiques to be a very intrigu-
ing and challenging commentary on this burgeoning
area of the discipline, especially because we participated
in each of these special issues and engaged in other
theistically related research (e.g., Reber, 2006a; Reber,
2006b; Reber, Slife, & Downs, 2012; Reber, Slife, &
Sanders, 2012; Slife & Reber, 2012; Slife, Reber, &
Lefevor, 2012; Slife & Reber 2009a, 2009b; Slife &
Zhang, in press; Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt, 2010; Slife
& Whoolery, 2006; Slife and Melling, 2006).
We very much appreciate the inclusion of our work
in these critical examinations because we highly value
the role of critical analysis in advancing a field of study.
We feel these critiques raise a number of important
and insightful questions concerning the prospect of a
theistic approach to psychology, which have deepened
our thinking about some of the key implications of the-
ism for psychology. These questions have also helped us
think more critically about some of the assumptions of
our critics’ positions and the broader conceptualization
of the relationship among worldviews they represent.
We hope to further the dialogue on this important topic
by critically examining the assumptions and implica-
tions of important sides of this issue.
In order to focus our reply to the critics, we re-
spond directly to an exemplar critique that appeared in
a recently published issue of the journal,
Zygon: Journal
of Religion and Science
, by Daniel Helminiak (2010),
titled
“Theistic psychology and psychotherapy”: A theologi-
cal and scientific critique.
We have chosen Helminiak’s
critique of theistic psychology because it is illustrative of
the kinds of criticism typically directed toward a theistic
approach to psychology. Moreover, Helminiak is one
of the more consistent and careful critics of theistic psy-
chology generally (e.g., Helminiak, 2008, 2012), and
our work specifically (e.g., Helminiak, 2001, 2010).
Not only has he written more than other critics, over a
longer period of time, but we have also corresponded
with him on these issues so that we understand his
position in greater depth. Yet, we do not experience
his critique or position as at all idiosyncratic. Indeed,
we view him as representative of what we will call the
conventional view of the relationship between psychol-
ogy and theism, and we will cite other critiques that will
affirm his representativeness.
One of the key differences we see between our as-
sumptions about a theistic approach to psychology and
critics, such as Helminiak, concerns the way in which
