Christian Psychology
15
“methods” that might reveal them, are somehow unim-
portant to the natural methods and events of interest.
Methodological naturalists have to presume a world,
in other words, in which supernatural events are not
sufficiently important to the natural that they need to
be taken into account in fully understanding the world
(Schafersman, 1997).
Not a Relativism
We recognize that this alternative frame is unfamiliar
to many psychologists and critics of a theistic approach
to psychology who work within the conventional frame
and conceptualize worldviews, methods, theories, and
disciplines according to subjectivity/objectivity dual-
ism. Given this dualistic lens, we understand why the
alternative we describe raises concerns about relativism,
such as those expressed by our exemplar critic Helmin-
iak (2010). Speaking of those advocating a theistic
approach to psychology, Helminiak wrote, “they do
not believe in objective truth. At this point aren’t they
relativists?” (p. 66). This is a common misconception
of the hermeneutic view we have discussed (Bernstein,
1983; Warnke, 1994). The misconception occurs
because the dualism of subjectivity and objectivity is
assumed, which means any questioning of the objectiv-
ity of truth can only leave us with subjectivity (Greiffen-
hagen & Sharrock, 2008). It is not so much relativism,
then, but the threat of subjectivism that is feared. This
is the reason Helminiak asserts that “the claim that the-
ism enjoys a reliable, valid religious or spiritual source of
knowledge on a par with that of science . . . threatens to
subvert the whole enterprise of evidence-based research
and scholarship” (p. 50). The dualism of naturalism
and theism makes the latter, in principle, subjective and
therefore an ungrounded set of ideas—the “nonproduc-
tive chaos” that Alcock (2009, p. 82) rightly abhors.
However, this argument is wholly misguided.
There is no subjectivism to fear in the alternative frame
of worldview relations we have described because the
dualism of subjectivity and objectivity is not assumed
in the first place (Greiffenhagen & Sharrock, 2008).
Instead, meanings are assumed, which, in a hermeneu-
tic framework, are not ungrounded ideas (Gadamer,
1997; Warnke, 1994). Meanings do not refer to the
contents of the mind of the interpreter or to the objects
in themselves. Instead, they are mutually constituted
by the interpreter, interpretive context, and the thing
interpreted (Heidegger, 1962). In terms familiar to the
dualist, they are inextricably interpreted realities—sub-
jective objectivities or objective subjectivities—with nei-
ther the “subjective” nor the “objective” aspects of these
meanings separable from one another (Slife, Reber, &
Faulconer, 2012).
In this sense, scientific study is a fusion of the
things scientists study and the scientists themselves,
both of which are inextricably related. This notion of
inextricable relation or mutual constitution is not for-
eign to the natural sciences. On the contrary, it is one
of the key lessons of modern science; the observed and
observer cannot be ontologically separated (e.g., relativ-
ity theory, quantum theory, Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle, etc.). The inextricable relation of interpreter
and interpreted that co-constitute scientific findings do
not make the resulting meaning purely subjective, as the
conventionalist fears. On the contrary, the relationship
grounds the meaning. A full explication of this ground-
ing of meaning in a nondualistic framework is beyond
the scope of this paper. For such an explication we refer
the reader to our own work elsewhere (Slife, 2004; Slife,
Reber, & Faulconer, 2012; Slife & Richardson, in press)
and to the work of other philosophers of science and
psychologists working within the hermeneutic tradition
(e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Fishman, 1999; Messer, Sass &
Woolfolk, 1988; Packer & Addison, 1989; Richardson,
Fowers, & Guignon, 1999).
Implications
We close with a key implication of the alternative
framework for worldview relations: a hermeneutic
framework for worldview relations makes those concep-
tions once considered more objective actually less objec-
tive, and those considered more subjective, less subjec-
tive. Naturalism, in this sense, is not as “objective” as
its adherents purport and, therefore naturalists must be
more mindful of their biases. This mindfulness is par-
ticularly important if they are to avoid the dogmatism
that critics of a theistic approach to psychology seem
to find so repugnant (Helminiak, 2010; Alcock, 2009;
Hibberd, 2012). Being aware of biases is particularly
important for adherents of the naturalistic worldview
for whom there is a tendency, as we have discussed, to
see biases in other worldviews but not in their own.
One reason for this tendency is that the naturalistic
worldview is taken to be more objective than all other
worldviews and methodological naturalism is assumed
to be neutral with regard to other methods. A related
reason for this tendency is that biases are assumed to be
bad because they adulterate objectivity with subjectiv-
ity and sully the knowledge claims of the discipline.
Consequently, biases are to be eliminated or at least sig-
nificantly reduced and controlled to get to the objective
truth of the world, and where they cannot be reduced
and controlled they are often, as we have shown, simply
denied.
The acclaimed hermeneuticist, Hans Georg Ga-
damer, has described this conventionalist view of bias
elsewhere as “the prejudice against prejudice” (Gadamer,
1997; p. 273; Slife & Reber, 2009b; Slife, Reber, &
Lefevor, 2012). By this he means that philosophical
presuppositions, like the subjectivity/objectivity dualism
that informs the naturalistic worldview as well as the
conventional framing of the relation of worldviews, bias
scientists against what they perceive to be subjective
biases. Thus, critics of a theistic approach to psychology
REBER AND SLIFE
