Christian Psychology
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are biased against the theistic worldview because they
see theism as subjectivity, and they fear the damage to
the presumed objectivity of science that would result
if theism were allowed to participate in psychological
science. They are also biased against any biases in their
own naturalistic worldview, which leads them to down-
play the philosophy of science literature that exposes the
biases of naturalism (Helminiak, 2010). The prejudice
against prejudice also leads them to treat the untested
presuppositions of the naturalistic worldview as if they
have passed an empirical test that the presuppositions
of other worldviews, like theism, have failed (Alcock,
2009). Despite their efforts and denial, naturalistic psy-
chologists have not escaped biases, including especially
their bias against biases.
The other side of this implication is that concep-
tions previously considered to be “subjective” are less
so than conventionally assumed. From the alterna-
tive perspective of worldview relations, the dualism of
objectivity and subjectivity is not assumed so biases are
not viewed as necessarily dangerous subjectivities that
threaten valid knowledge. Instead, biases are mean-
ings that are particular to a given worldview and can
potentially illuminate features of a phenomenon that
the meanings of other worldviews may not illuminate.
In this sense, biases are indispensable to the interpretive
process (Gadamer, 1997).
The focus in this case is not to eliminate or reduce
biases and it certainly is not to cover them over or deny
them. The focus is to know the biases of the world-
view as fully as possible so we can understand how the
meanings of a worldview can reveal certain aspects of a
phenomenon while concealing others. By knowing and
monitoring the activity of our biases we can know, at
least to some degree, the opportunities and limitations
of a naturalistic method or theory, just as we can know
the opportunities and limitations of a theistic method
or theory. We can examine the extent to which the
meanings of different worldviews are helpful in advanc-
ing knowledge and can preserve and discard theories
and methods accordingly.
This implies that theism is not as subjective (to
use the terminology of the dualist again) as has been
presupposed by its critics, many psychologists, and even
some theists. It is not merely “personal belief, popular
piety, and collective superstition,” (Helminiak, 2010, p.
50), at least not any more than naturalism is. Like nat-
uralism, theism is a fusion of the values, assumptions,
and meanings of the adherents of the worldview and the
meanings of the phenomena, activities, and events they
study. This integration of meanings might illuminate
knowledge of a phenomenon that other worldviews
may conceal or ignore (just as theism itself conceals or
ignores certain understandings of phenomena). In this
way, theism could have more of what the dualist would
describe as objective value, meaning that it might have
something important to say about our world and may
genuinely contribute to knowledge advancement. If
this is true, then theism could advance psychologists’
understanding of the psychological phenomenon of
interest, generate new theories, and lead to the develop-
ment of new methods (Slife, Reber, & Lefevor, 2012).
Is there evidence to support this possibility? We believe
there is preliminary evidence for this possibility, some of
which has come from our own research.
We have recently published reviews of this theistic
research (Slife, Reber, & Lefevor, 2012) as well as mod-
els of empirical theistic investigation (Reber, Slife, &
Downs, 2012) to demonstrate how this research can be
and is being done. We refer the reader to these models
for the full details of these studies, but we note here that
a theistic worldview was used to guide scientific inquiry
into two phenomena of import to psychologists: god
image and prejudice. Our results illuminated impor-
tant aspects of these two phenomena that studies guided
by a naturalistic worldview have thus far overlooked
or concealed. It is also apparent that these findings are
not “nonfalsifiable claims” (Helminiak, 2010, p. 66)
grounded in “a sheer assertion of religious faith” (p. 65).
These studies can be replicated, the methods and instru-
ments critically evaluated, and the findings tested. We
have already begun several more studies that do exactly
that, including neuroscience paradigms. Thus, we see
no in principle reason that scientific inquiry, guided
by a theistic worldview, cannot advance psychological
knowledge.
Although theistic premises guided our investiga-
tion into these two phenomena, we did operate within
the narrower view of science that methodological
naturalism prescribes. Thus, we followed the traditional
scientific method research protocol that is typically
used in naturalistic studies of god image and preju-
dice. We acknowledge that in some cases traditional
scientific methods can be used in research guided by
a theistic worldview. As we have discussed elsewhere,
even a method that was not designed to fit a particular
worldview can at times be usefully applied to research
questions guided by that worldview, just as a hammer
can sometimes be used in a pinch to pound screws
(Reber, Slife, & Sanders, 2012; Slife & Reber, 2009b).
This is where the claims of methodological naturalists
make some sense to us (e.g., Bishop, 2009). These natu-
ralists, however, should also acknowledge the limitations
of naturalistically guided methods to investigate certain
topics, including many theistic topics, as we have
discussed elsewhere (Reber, 2000; Reber, 2006a; Reber,
Slife, & Sanders, 2012; Slife & Reber, 2009b; Slife &
Reber, 2012; Slife, Reber, & Lefevor, 2012).
Such limitations raise the question of how to
handle research topics that lie beyond a given set of
methods (e.g., logical positivism, methodological natu-
ralism)? How can they be conceptualized, examined,
and given an opportunity to compete in the market-
place of ideas? In response to these questions, we have
THEISTIC PSYCHOLOGY AND THE RELATION OF WORLDVIEWS
