Christian Psychology
17
suggested that the discipline broaden its definition of
science to mean the systematic investigation of ideas,
with systematic investigation referring not only to the
methodological procedures of each method but more
importantly to the different philosophies that implicitly
inform and guide the methods (Reber, Slife, & Sanders,
2012; Slife & Reber, 2009b; see also Johnson, 2007).
In other words, this kind of systematic investigation
can proceed in many different, potentially illuminat-
ing ways, all of which can be examined as to their
appropriateness to the meanings that constitute the
phenomenon and their contribution to psychologists’
understanding of the phenomenon. Those worldviews,
epistemologies, and methods that do not advance
knowledge of the phenomenon, and this would include
theism, would not bear disciplinary fruit, and would
eventually be eliminated.
This alternative, pluralistic conception of science
illustrates a key difference between a hermeneutic
framework for worldviews and the subjectivism of our
conventionally-minded critics. A proper pluralism is
not an “’anything goes’ relativism” (Mootz, 2010, p.
273; Warnke, 1994). The worldviews that guide meth-
odologies must establish a track record of knowledge
advancement in the discipline if they are to remain in
the marketplace of ideas. Their methods must illumi-
nate appropriate meanings of a phenomenon of impor-
tance to psychology in order to remain relevant.
A pluralistic psychology also requires a comprehen-
sive knowledge of the relationship among worldviews,
with relationship understood as encompassing not only
similarities but also differences (Reber, Slife, & Sanders,
2012). Worldviews would maintain and value their dif-
ferences without the pretense of separability and supe-
riority that marks the conventional view. In this sense,
proponents of a theistic approach to psychology do not
necessarily have an interest in taking over the discipline,
as Helminiak’s (2010) “Trojan Horse” analogy implies.
This fear is a leftover from the dualist perspective where
“subjective” worldviews are considered more strident
and dogmatic. As we have described, naturalists can be
equally strident and dogmatic. Our position, instead,
implies more of a disciplinary pluralism of world-
views and philosophies, including epistemologies and
ontologies. An exclusive theistic psychology, in this
sense, would ignore relationships that are needed for a
full understanding of its very identity, not to mention
the very real contribution of a naturalistic approach to
psychology.
Jeffrey S. Reber
is associate professor of psychology at
Brigham Young University and incoming president of
the Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psycholo-
gy (Division 24 of the American Psychological Associa-
tion). His research interests include critical thinking
about psychology, the relationship between religion and
psychology, the meaning and possibility of altruism, and
relational social psychology. Correspondence concern-
ing this article should be addressed to Jeffrey S. Reber,
1092 SWKT, Department of Psychology, Brigham
Young University, Provo, UT 84602. Email: jeff_reber@
byu.edu
Brent D. Slife
is currently Professor of Psychology at
Brigham Young University. Honored recently with an
APA Presidential Citation for his contribution to psy-
chology, Dr. Slife has served as the President of the Soci-
ety of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology and on
the editorial boards of eight journals. He has authored
over 200 articles and books, including
Critical Think-
ing about Psychology
(2005, APA Books),
Taking Sides
(2009, McGraw-Hill),
Critical Issues in Psychotherapy
(2001, Sage Publications),
What’s Behind the Research?
(1995, Sage Publications), and
Time and Psychologi-
cal Explanation
(1993, SUNY Press). Correspondence
regarding this article should be addressed to Brent D.
Slife, Dept. of Psychology, Brigham Young University,
Provo, UT 84602. Email:
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REBER AND SLIFE
