Christian Psychology
22
faith traditions in its explorations of the place of virtue
and meaning in living the good life, and in its detailed
consideration of the psychology of wisdom, post trau-
matic growth, gratitude, and compassion. If anything,
the problem lies in the other direction. There is in many
circles a kind of ‘theological reductionism’, influenced
by the echoes of Barthian neo-orthodoxy, which actively
resists and refutes natural scientific accounts of areas
that are thought to fall more properly under the domain
of revealed truth. I come across this repeatedly as a
teacher in a seminary, and in church communities from
the reformed tradition.
Having presented a very strong dualistic account of
the relationship between natural scientific and theistic
approaches to human behaviour, the authors move
on to offer the hermeneutic alternative of ‘worldview
interdependence’ that they believe to be potentially
more fruitful. Indeed they go further, stating their belief
that it is a ‘more accurate interpretation of the histori-
cal relationship between them.’ They do not offer any
evidence for this claim of ‘accuracy’, which is itself a
notion that seems somewhat out of place in the context
of a hermeneutic framework.
Their point is that natural and theistic perspectives
on human mental life and behaviour might be seen as
complementary. This seems a reasonable (rather than
‘accurate’) claim. However, it is hardly new. It has been
articulated in various guises by many who work at the
interface of theology and psychology – for instance Fra-
ser Watts) and by philosophers interested in emergent
properties, most notably Nancey Murphy’s account of
‘non-reductive physicalism’.
Complementary dialogical approaches of this sort
that acknowledge a degree of overlap in the phenomena
addressed are not at odds with the APA’s 2007 state-
ment on the relationship between psychology and faith.
This statement acknowledges the reality that several
world views may be brought to bear on a particular field
of interest, but prohibits a reductionist stance by any by
acting as an arbiter among the others; it does not rule
out dialogue. In this way it rules out the position of a
creationist or a Richard Dawkins but does not rule out
a conversation between, or on occasion an integration
of a theological and scientific account of the world.
The nature of such a conversation is crucial. As
these authors point out, each approach has a respon-
sibility to attend to its barely conscious and often
unstated epistemological assumptions and socio-
political values and objectives. Where two approaches
are in significant tension with each other the aspiration
to integration or harmonisation will be inappropriate.
Here the notion of ‘critical friend’ may be useful. After
all we see this in science in the wave and particle models
of light, and we find it in the Judaeo -Christian scrip-
tures with the tensions between the four evangelists, the
apostles Peter and Paul, the Law and the Spirit, and
the divine agenda of mercy and justice. To paraphrase
Psalm 85:
Science and faith are met together; psychology and
religion have kissed each other.
Joanna Collicutt
is Karl Jaspers Lecturer in Psychol-
ogy and Spirituality at Ripon College Cuddesdon and
a Supernumerary Fellow in Psychology of Religion at
Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford. Her
professional background is in clinical neuropsychol-
ogy and her current research interests are in positive
psychology, psychological approaches to the Bible, and
neurology and the human person. She has published
journal articles and books in all these areas, and has
more in preparation. She is currently working on a book
for SCM Press on psychology and Christian ministerial
formation. Correspondence concerning this comment
should be addressed to Revd Dr. Joanna Collicutt,
Supernumerary Fellow (Psychology of Religion), Harris
Manchester College, Mansfield Road, Oxford OX1
3TD, United Kingdom. Email: joanna.Collicutt@hmc.
ox.ac.uk
References
Helminiak, D. (2010). “Theistic psychology and psy-
chotherapy”: A theological and scientific critique.
Zygon, 45
, 47-74.
Murphy, N. (2006).
Bodies and souls or spirited bodies?
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Watts, F. (2002).
Theology and psychology.
Farnham:
Ashgate.
The Varieties of Scientific Experience
Mark Freeman
College of the Holy Cross
Jeffrey Reber and Brent Slife have written an extremely
thoughtful, provocative, and important rejoinder to
those who would wish to keep theistic commitments
outside the gates of psychology. “For the thoroughgo-
ing theist,” they write, “divine involvement is a present,
ongoing, and difference-making activity. However, if
divine activity truly makes a difference in the world,
then excluding it, as the naturalist does, is problematic
for a complete and comprehensive science” (p. 6). No-
tice what is being said in this introductory formulation
of the problem: if divine activity truly makes a differ-
ence in the world, then insofar as psychology remains
steadfastly committed to naturalism, it cannot help but
remains incomplete – indeed, one might add, insuffi-
ciently
scientific
. There is a flip side to this formulation
as well: the path to becoming
sufficiently
scientific must
(from Reber and Slife’s perspective) include the divine.
The idea is a radical one, to be sure. Is it a plausible
one?
I should note from the start that, although I do not
see myself as an advocate for theistic psychology, I am
