Christian Psychology
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Subsequent generations of psychologists became
increasingly trained primarily in the newly delimited
discipline and its attendant investigatory methods.
This perhaps not surprisingly led some in psychology
to mistake the discipline’s naturalistic method for its
metaphysic (Robinson, 1995). We have also allowed
our methodological approaches to shape and limit our
discipline proactively. But as Leplin (1997) has argued,
science has never been restricted by its methodology for
long. When intriguing new theories arise that cannot
be tested using existing methodologies scientists invent
new methods to do so. Einstein’s theory of general rela-
tivity turned Newton on his head in 1915 but it took
over 4 decades before any precise empirical tests of the
theory could be offered. The methodology had to be in-
vented in response to the theory. Still, the tests that were
eventually developed had sufficient continuity with
other methods and theoretical- mathematical models
in physics to allow for the evidence to be compelling to
those whom may have otherwise championed Newton’s
classical vision. If the only test of the new paradigm is
one that would not have evidential force to a person
outside of the new paradigm, then the test would be
incapable of vindicating the new theory except among
those already biased towards it.
This I think is the impulse behind methodologi-
cal naturalism. We agree, tacitly or explicitly, to ask
questions in ways that our methods can answer. To a
certain extent this requires us to delimit the questions
we ask across our operative worldviews and biases in
psychology (e..g, transpersonal, biogenic, cognitive,
analytic, humanistic, etc.). I would suggest that the
Reber and Slife’s efforts at demonstrating the value of
theistic contributions to psychology using standard
research methodologies from the field in fact illustrate
this shared dialogical commitment to a common core
consensus fostering space despite their Bernsteinian
ontology providing little basis doing so.
We may well believe or even know
as individuals or
subgroups
additional things about human functioning
in the areas of our concern but we limit our efforts
as
a discipline
to what we can intersubjectively demon-
strate. Any approach that would abandon consensus
generating efforts under the claim that we are so theory
or paradigm laden in our observations that all data are
perspectivally delimited would be implicitly abandoning
the pursuit of psychology as a general human discipline.
A methodology which is only demonstrative if one
assumes the paradigm it is intended to evidence at the
outset is an exercise in questing begging.
Towards an alternative case for theism in psychology
Let me suggest an alternative strategy for theism in
psychology that avoids the question begging alternative
implied by the Heidegger via Bernstein inspired rejec-
tion of subjective-objective dualities.
1. Psychology inappropriately privileges meta-
physical naturalism in its theory building and
methodology.
2. Any worldview or perspective is a proper
source for psychological theory building in the
discipline of psychology provided a commu-
nity of psychological scholars who may not
share these perspectives can develop a way to
evaluate truth supportive or disconfirming im-
plications of those perspectives. Theism offers
a number of such concepts that imply testable
predictions that should be detectable within
existing psychological methods.
3. Because worldviews tend to synthesize and
interpret large domains of shared human ex-
perience that overlap with that experienced by
adherents of other worldviews, they often have
different ways of explaining and predicting
similar experiential patterns. While world-
view derived testable hypotheses may guide
psychology in some new directions, such as
exploring the clinical utility of forgiveness or
the impact of “grace” in human relationships,
the resulting lines of inquiry may not influ-
ence the overall worldview in psychology in
any precipitous manner. The data from such
studies can often be reinterpretated in ways
that are congruent for multiple worldviews.
Therefore, cultivating testable ideas to inform
psychology from theism does not mean
simpliciter adoption of theism as
the
under-
girding worldview for psychology will result.
Nor must we argue for such a worldview shift
before advancing theism derived contributions
in psychology.
4. Conclusion: Testable ideas derived from
theism are appropriate contributions to the
discipline of psychology.
5. Subdisciplinary Corollary: If theistic explana-
tory models and predictions can be pursued
in a manner consistent with non-question
begging consensus generating approaches in
the discipline of psychology, a theistic subdis-
cipline in psychology is warranted.
6. Disciplinary Corollary: If over time theism
provides a more productive set of testable
predictions and explanatory frameworks for
psychology than alternative paradigms, theis-
tic psychology should appropriately become a
favored paradigm for the discipline.
William Hathaway
is Dean of the School of Psychol-
ogy and Counseling at Regent University. He is a
licensed clinical psychologist with specialty training in
clinical child psychology. He has been active in various
professional service roles such as APA governance, APA’s
Commission on Accreditation, and the Virginia Board
of Psychology. He also holds appointments in Philoso-
