Christian Psychology
33
radically different worldviews that can be understood
and exist apart from one another” (p. 7). This plank in
their platform is mystifying to me, however, because
this “conventional” idea seems self-evidently true and
is affirmed by most Christians writing on the subject
of contemporary worldviews (e.g., Sire, 2009)! If any
worldviews are fundamentally incompatible and even
incommensurable, surely theism and naturalism fit the
bill. Their overall agenda here is valid—to criticize the
conventional preferential treatment given the worldview
of naturalism over theism—however, the road taken to
get there entails an increased ambiguity in how world-
views have been commonly understood by Christians
who work in the area.
For example, one noted author defines a worldview
as a subset of one’s beliefs that lie at the core of one’s to-
tal set of beliefs (see Nash, 1992). I would further define
a worldview, somewhat literally, as the subset of one’s
beliefs that constitutes one’s basic vision of the way the
world is, that plays a normative and legitimizing role in
relation to the rest of one’s beliefs, and that, because of
its importance, can also contribute substantially to one’s
identity. Beliefs exist in individuals (and communities)
in a hierarchy of value and influence. Some beliefs are
more core to their identities and lives as human persons
(e.g., humans are nothing more than evolved animals;
God is the greatest Good), and other beliefs are more
peripheral (A Ford is a good car). Worldview beliefs are
among the most important beliefs humans have because
of their normative, legitimizing role with respect to
their other beliefs. Unfortunately, because of finitude
and sin, humans are likely not able to be perfectly logi-
cally consistent in all their beliefs, though some talented
and highly motivated people presumably are pretty
consistent. A well-functioning worldview, one might ar-
gue, is one the beliefs of which are well-articulated and
have been used rather rigorously to assess as thoroughly
as possible the validity and coherence of one’s entire set
of beliefs.
As a result, worldviews are not just distinguishable
and separable; major, well-developed ones are by and
large incommensurable and fundamentally incompat-
ible. Consequently, the relation between markedly
different ones—like naturalism and theism—are more
antagonistic than interdependent; their interaction ap-
proximating more an evangelistic encounter, that seeks
an either-or conversion, than a conversational encoun-
ter, where mutual influence occurs naturally. When
seeking to demonstrate “
worldview
interdependence,”
Reber & Slife seem actually to be referring to “perspec-
tives” or “attitudes,” rather than “worldviews,” as com-
monly understood. For example, on p. 12 they mention
“distinct domains” or “contexts” of “faith” or “practices
of faith,” on the one hand, and “science” and “work
done in the lab,” on the other, and suggest the adjec-
tives “theistic” and “naturalistic” can be validly applied
accordingly. But these are spheres of human activity and
thought, not worldviews. As proof, the worldviews of
Christian theism and naturalism can both embrace “sci-
ence” and “work done in the lab.” Within such spheres,
there can certainly be interdependence, and noting
this
interdependence would have served their purposes quite
well, without making what seems to be a false claim
that naturalistic and theistic
worldviews
are interdepen-
dent. (Similarly, see the discussion on research on prayer
from a “naturalistic” “interpretation” and a “theistic”
“interpretation,” on p. 13.)
While it is true, sociohistorically, that the world-
views of naturalism and theism have had a great deal
of influence on one another over the last few hundred
years (though it has largely been one-directional, as
the authors point out),
Is cannot prove Ought
, so that
such a historical fact does not mean such influence is
necessarily a good thing for either worldview. On the
contrary, because of their incommensurability, such
influence may be seen as fundamentally destructive
to the receiving worldview, particularly when pursued
self-consciously. So, from the standpoint of committed
worldview adherents, worldview interdependence would
seem to be an epistemological vice. Yet the way Reber &
Slife use the phrase “worldview
interdependence
” seems
to imply much more than mere sociohistorical impact
on each other, but rather that they are somehow neces-
sarily reliant upon each other. Using such phraseology
does not do justice to the normative and regulative role
worldviews actually play at the core of one’s belief sys-
tem and in the formation of communal and individual
identity. At best, the influence of an alien worldview
on a particular worldview tradition should be “pro-
vocative,” for example, pointing to aspects of reality
and interrelationships previously underappreciated in
the tradition,
but interpreted from the standpoint of the
original tradition
. Thorough worldview interdependence
is called syncretism in religious studies, and unchecked
it will lead over time to the dissolution of the receiving
worldview community.
I suspect that their intention in this section is to
reassure the naturalist reader that they are not theistic
“fanatics,” and that they can appreciate that natural-
ism has value. Moreover, I recognize that Reber & Slife
conclude the essay with a discussion of “Worldview Dif-
ference,” where the earlier theme is somewhat qualified.
Nevertheless, I think that arguing in favor of worldview
interdependence in a naturalist-dominant culture is at
least short-sighted and potentially self-destructive.
Another question I have has to do with the authors’
basic reliance on what they call “a hermeneutic non-du-
alism,” derived from Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur,
which “does not distinguish objects as they exist in
themselves (objectivity) from representations of objects
in the mind (subjectivity).” The “world,” according to
this view, does not consist of “objects” but of “mean-
ings.” As a result, “naturalism,” they say, is a “framework
of meanings ‘in the Heideggerian sense.’” (p. 11)
