Christian Psychology
41
gan, Bernard; providence, theories of; theistic psychology.
I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute again
(see Helminiak, 2001, 2010; Helminiak, Hoffman,
& Dodson, 2012) to the discussion about psychology
and theism and to offer a critique of the latest theory
of the “theistic psychologists” (Reber & Slife, this issue;
see also Slife, Reber, & Lefevor, 2012), a small, highly
coordinated and industrious group, centered at Brigham
Young University (BYU). Other groups also have
concerns about relating theology and science (Collins,
1983; Eck, 1996; Hill & Kauffmann, 1996; Jones,
2006; Vande Kemp, 1996; Wood, 1995), but their
approaches differ; so the name “theistic psychologists”
applies to no one category. The claim of Richards and
Bergin (2005) of BYU, that their “theistic personality
theory” (p. 112) is “a multidimensional, ecumenical
psychology, not a specific theology” (p. 116) is unsus-
tainable. On the key issue, “not only is theistic-psychol-
ogy’s [divine] interventionism not generic; it is also not
mainstream” (Helminiak, 2010, p. 65). Nonetheless,
since Reber, Slife, and their colleagues are the main
focus of this paper, by their self-appropriated name,
“theistic psychologists,” I will mean that group unless I
specify otherwise. I respond in detail because they name
me as their “exemplar critic” (Reber & Slife, this issue,
p. 6.2) and describe me as “representative of what [they]
call the conventional view of the relationship between
psychology and theism” (p. 5.2)—although they badly
misrepresent my position. Happily, I find new ideas in
this evolving theory, and I, first, highlight those ideas as
I understand them. Then I focus the essential feature of
that theory, routine divine intervention, and its similari-
ties and contrasts within Western theism; I deconstruct
Reber and Slife’s (this issue) pivotal argument about a
dualism of naturalism and theism, a supposed parallel
to objectivity and subjectivity; and I clarify and delimit
their appeal to hermeneutical theory. In conclusion,
I contextualize this discussion within an array of de-
nominational differences, focusing on Mormonism, and
within the historical changes catalyzed by the scientific
revolution.
New Ideas from the “Theistic Psychologists”
Six Points of Novelty
First, weaving together religious beliefs, the “bible” of
the movement fabricated a “philosophical” position
to ground “theistic psychology” and called it “scien-
tific theism” (Richards & Bergin, 2005, pp. 97-102,
314-329). Now Reber and Slife (this issue) invoke an
independent and well-established approach, “the her-
meneutic view” (p. 15.1), to ground and integrate their
agenda within standard psychology of religion. More on
this attempt below.
Second, Reber and Slife (this issue) have softened
the claim about conflict between science and religion.
Relying on accurate historical report, they now ac-
knowledge it was medieval Christian culture that actu-
ally “led to the development of alternative methods, like
the empirical method” (p. 11.2). Similarly, they now
call the “war” (Bartz, 2009, p. 72; Richards & Bergin,
2005, pp. 32-39) between religion and science only a
“strongly disputed traditional story” and a “supposed
conflict,” “however untrue” (Reber & Slife, this issue,
p. 9.1; see Helminiak, 2010, pp. 55-56; Helminiak,
Hoffman, & Dodson, 2012, p. 187-188). The historical
facts speak for themselves.
Third, the theistic psychologists now outright also
allow that naturalism, i.e., standard scientific method
and practice, can make valid contributions. They admit
“the very real contribution of a naturalistic approach to
psychology” (p. 17.1) so that in some ways “the claims
of methodological naturalists make some sense” (p.
16.2). I emphasize the admission that making sense,
reasonableness, now also counts—although one must
ask against what criteria “making sense” is judged. As if
following the criterion of Jesus, “You will know them
by their fruits” (Matthew 7:20), the theistic psycholo-
gists credit “evidence” (pp. 13.2, 16.2), “disciplinary
fruit,” and “a track record of knowledge advancement”
(p. 17.1). Following standard scientific method and
especially Bernard Lonergan’s (1957/1992, 1972,
1980/1990) cognitional theory, I take relevant evidence
as an essential facet of all human knowledge. On target,
then, and no longer exalting “revelation” as an incontro-
vertible source of knowledge (Reber, 2006b; Richards
and Bergin 2005, p. 318; Slife and Richards, 2001;
Slife and Whoolery, 2006), the theistic psychologists
validate human intellect, as well. In seeming contradic-
tion, however, still resisting the unavoidable conclu-
sion, as documented in the comments about the law of
gravity below, Reber and Slife (this issue, pp. 13.2-14.1)
disallow that these three named evidentiary indicators
increase scientific credibility (or “objectivity,” in their
ambiguous terminology: see below). In any case, the
validity of scientific claims and those of religion now
appears to be more evenly assessed. Indeed, the theistic
psychologists allow that, also “biased” like science, “the-
ism itself conceals or ignores certain understandings of
phenomena” (p. 16.1).
Fourth, in the same vein, there also occurs the ex-
plicit and most welcome statement that “naturalists…are
not necessarily anti-God or anti-theist per se” (Slife, Re-
ber, & Lefevor, 2012, p. 220). Science is no longer that
nefarious “naturalistic-atheistic worldview” (Richard &
Bergin, 2005, p 19). Nonetheless, only those who agree
with the theistic psychologists are still said to adhere
to “strong” or “thoroughgoing” theism; others are only
“weak” theists (Slife, Reber, & Lefevor, 2012, p. 220).
This disparaging distinction perdures since Slife and
Melling (2006, p. 282) crafted it to defend their version
of theism before their sympathetic Evangelical colleagues
who did not, however, insist as forcefully on routine,
divine interventions (e.g., Jones, 2006; Tan, 2006).
