Christian Psychology
47
cal nature of homosexuality that Evangelical Christians
and the Vatican still find in the Bible, for example, or
the uneducable nature of females that some Islamic
societies affirm, or the existence of a sun (or planet)
Kolob, where, according to Mormon belief, the throne
of god is located? Thus far I have seen no instance of
theistic unlawful involvement that withstands criticism
(see Helminiak, 2010, pp. 63-67; Helminiak, Hoffman,
& Dodson, 2012). The latest examples—god image,
prejudice, prayer, and forgiveness (a notion central
also to
non-theist
Buddhism; compare Reber & Slife,
this issue, p. 12.1)—are standard topics of standard
psychology amenable to standard research methods,
as Reber and Slife admit (p. 16.2; also Slife, Reber, &
Lefevor, 2012). No miraculous or extraordinary or even
ongoing divine interventions need pertain. Then, what
rational credibility does this insistence on ongoing and
difference-making divine involvement merit when no
evidentiary instance can be named? Of course, for the
theistic psychologists, the matter is emphatically not
about rational credibility but, rather, about bald and
blind assertions of faith. Once again it is clear that these
assertions, on the one hand, and the conclusions of
reasoned and evidence-based argument, on the other,
are in irreconcilable opposition. They cannot both stand
but differ regarding one and the same knowledge claim
about one and the same reality.
Thus far, apart from the one novelty listed as “fifth”
far above, I see no needed, useful, or helpful content for
psychology or any science in the agenda of the theistic
psychologists. Providential naturalism, a perfectly fine
theory for the integration of theology and science, has
been available for centuries. Lonergan (1957/1992,
1971, 1972; Helminiak, 1998) updated it; and with
it believers, simple and sophisticated, comfortably and
confidently acknowledge God’s difference-making activ-
ity in a world that is here, that continues to exist, and
that unfolds and develops. The theistic psychologists
avoid acknowledging this theory or discussing it in any
substantive way, and they offer no meaningful correc-
tion, supplement, or alternative to it. As an intellectual
enterprise, their project is a bust. What they offer, at
best, is encouragement to believers to be more vocal and
specific about their religious beliefs—an enterprise of
increasingly dubious value in a pluralistic global society
(Helminiak, 2008c).
The Supposed Dualism of Naturalism versus Theism
Reber and Slife (this issue) make a somewhat new
attempt at integrating psychology and theology—or
in their ever shifting terminology, “science and reli-
gion,” “naturalism and theism” (pp. 9.1, 10.1), “science
and faith” (p. 9.1), or “the natural sciences” and “the
humanities” (p. 7.1). They advance this integration by
softening their former opinion that too easily pitted
science against religion in a competitive dualism, and
they construe their former opinion as the still prevail-
ing conventional view. As the demarcating criterion
between the members of those pairs, they propose “the
dualism of objectivity and subjectivity” (p. 6.2). The
result is “two worldviews, with theism on the subjective
side clearly separated from naturalism on the objective
side” (p. 7.2). Then “faith is subjective and uncritical
and as a result is subject to bias and error. Science is
objective and critical and as a result is relatively uninflu-
enced by bias and is relatively free from error” (p. 9.1).
Their caricatural “conventional view” takes these two
to be separable and takes the objective to be superior to
the subjective (pp. 7.1-10.2). These theistic psycholo-
gists would overcome this dualism by placing the pairs
on a level field.
Leveling the Field by Clarification or by Obfuscation
I suggest that two approaches could be used to achieve
this “leveling” (Reber & Slife, this issue, abstract). One
would be to advance theology to a state of a precisely
defined, highly critical, fully integrated, and explicitly
methodical discipline that, in its own realm, would be
the equal of contemporary science. This is the positive
contribution that Lonergan (1972) offered in
Method
in Theology
and I, in
Religion and the Human Sciences
(Helminiak, 1998). This tack respects the power of
human intelligence and the importance of human
reasonableness, or, in a word, the indispensability of
human “authenticity” (Lonergan, 1972, pp. 20, 52,
79-80, 104, 110, 121-122, 252, 265). This tack allows
that all areas of human experience can eventually be
treated technically, scientifically, while recognizing that
the human sciences are far more challenging than the
natural sciences and that science is not practice, theol-
ogy is not religion, ideas are not reality, and theory is
not living—although good theory is mightily helpful
for good living. It is with such thoughts in mind that I
criticize the loose conceptualization, shifting terminol-
ogy, and narrow perspectives of the theistic psycholo-
gists. A robust theory is available. Nonetheless, to be
fair, I know no one today, apart from the Lonerganians,
who believes that such rigorous scholarship, correct
understanding, and science-like opinion are possible
in the human sciences. Still, the uninformed
status quo
does not merit acquiescence.
The other approach moves in the opposite direc-
tion to level the field. Instead of making theology more
critical and scientific, it deflates science to make it
more like popular religious discourse. Then metaphors,
imagery, and merely suggestive language reign; and the
conclusions of science are said to be no more valid or
true to reality than are the symbols of religion—even
though, for example, the mass of the electron can be
measured accurately to the twelfth decimal place, and
with the “trick” of “implicit definition” via equations
(Helminiak, 1996a, ch. 5; Lonergan, 1957/1992, p.
37), physicists precisely, univocally, express their opin-
ions to colleagues of differing cultures around the globe.
