Christian Psychology
42
Fifth, it is now recognized that “in some cases
traditional scientific methods can be used in research
guided by a theistic worldview” (Reber & Slife, this
issue, p. 16.2). Therewith, the theistic psychologists
finally (see Helminiak, 2010, pp. 62-65) specify a valid,
potential contribution of theism to naturalist research.
Namely, sometimes ideas that derive from distant per-
spectives, for example, religious believe or speculation—
but because these hold no monopoly in this regard, one
must also add novels, science fiction, a good vacation,
or stories and analogies, e.g., Daniel Dennett’s (1991)
“intuition pumps” (pp. 282, 440)—can raise questions,
suggest hypotheses, and provoke research for hardcore
science. Helminiak (1998, pp. 105-107) already elabo-
rated such a contribution of “the theist viewpoint” to
the natural and human sciences.
Sixth and finally, the theistic psychologists no lon-
ger insist so forcefully on different kinds of truths, each
with its proprietary criteria, i.e., religious versus scien-
tific, as Reber (2006a, p. 273; see Helminiak, 2010,
p. 66) did emphatically, for example. Their theory
now envisages a horizon of meaning in which differ-
ent “worldviews” could contribute to “a complete and
comprehensive science” (p. 6.1)—that is, presumably,
one correct understanding, one truth. In terms of “Four
viewpoints on the Human,” Helminiak (1986a, 1987a)
elaborated such a comprehensive science in extensive
detail, including theology and “theotics” (which regards
specifically Christian belief, untouched in the present
discussion, about human deification in Christ through
the Holy Spirit), all under the category of
science
(Hel-
miniak, 1982, 1987b, 1996a, 1996b, 1998, 2011).
Preliminary Observations about the Novelties
Applying Lonergan’s (1957/1992) notion of “higher
viewpoints” (pp. 37-43; 1980/1990, pp. 54-55; see
Helminiak, 2011, pp. 9-13), such an enterprise of inte-
grated comprehensive science is certainly possible. The
strategy of the theistic psychologists, however, is unclear
and seems unworkable. In confusing elaboration, still
advocating the incoherent “methodological pluralism”
of “scientific theism” (Richards & Bergin, 2005, pp.
101-102, 324-329; see Helminiak, 2010, pp. 66-68),
Reber and Slife’s (this issue) supposed integrative vision
comprises “a disciplinary pluralism of worldviews and
philosophies, including epistemologies and ontologies”
(p. 17.1). Granted, these technical terms are bandied
about with ever shifting meaning in agnostic postmod-
ern academic discussion. But, honestly, how could there
ever be more than one valid ontology and, perforce,
more than one reality? Besides, alongside “natural-
ism,” the theistic psychologists continue to emphasize
enigmatic, never explicated, presumably particularistic
“‘religious’ methods” (pp. 14.2-15.1; the curious quota-
tion marks attempt, perhaps, to respond to the criticism
of Helminiak, 2010, p. 53, that religion is not an
academic discipline with methods for generating knowl-
edge), “theistic methods,” “theistic ‘truths’” (Reber &
Slife, this issue, p. 10.1, again with curious quotation
marks that may belie point six above), a “theistic ap-
proach,” and “a theistic method or theory” (p. 16.1). In
the theistic psychologists’ elaboration of their own posi-
tion, the contrast between naturalism and theism, that
touchstone of theistic psychology, stands undiminished.
This perduring insistence on theistic epistemic unique-
ness suggests that Reber and Slife (this issue) never even
articulate an integration, let alone achieve one.
That “disciplinary pluralism of worldviews and
philosophies” (p. 17.1) implies that no coherent intel-
lectual integration could even be possible. Despite
verbal insistence on integrated, comprehensive knowl-
edge, the theistic psychologists’ continued insistence on
“worldview difference” and “different frameworks for
meanings”—“Theism and naturalism are very different
worldviews” (p. 12.2)—precludes the supposed integra-
tion. Why so? Because “different frameworks of mean-
ing” entail different understandings, which implicate
different ontologies, which posit different realities. We
seem still to be left with two competing understand-
ings, not only of methodological approaches, but also
of different universes. This outcome vitiates the revised
theory of the theistic psychologists, but this outcome
is unavoidable. If, according to hermeneutical theory,
which is valid in this regard, human reality is consti-
tuted by meaning (see Lonergan, 1972, pp. 78, 356),
different worldviews entail different meanings and,
perforce, different realities. Of course, I am using the
term
meaning
in the sense of pure, cognitive content,
that which is understood, not in the more prevalent
amorphous sense of personal import or significance,
what something “means” or how it “matters” to you or
me (see Lonergan, 1957/1992, pp. 316-317, 320-323).
(More on hermeneutical theory below)
So, in the end, despite the verbal rejection of a
dualism of “worldviews, theism and naturalism” (p.
6.1), which is the backbone of Reber and Slife’s “Reply
to the Critics,” this very dualism continues to control
the theory of the theistic psychologists. Emerging from
the shelter of infallible revealed “truths” and tentatively
accepting also the validity of naturalistic “truths,” the
theistic psychologists entangle themselves in the post-
modern malaise that despairs of any truth (Cahoone,
2010, p. 47). They attempt to newly resolve their
dilemma by buying into a postmodern theory of reality,
hermeneutical theory; and this theory’s very lack of cri-
teria for the correctness of competing worldviews allows
them ambivalently to affirm naturalistic, reasoned, and
evidence-based conclusions while still holding firmly to
blatantly incompatible revelation, “theistic methods,”
and a rather peculiar understanding of theism (see
below). That this arrangement is “meaningful” to them
(it carries personal import) does not assure that the
“meanings” involved (cognitive content) are compatible.
Their theoretical dualism perdures.
