Christian Psychology
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the classical period, theology was “the discussion of God
or the gods,” including “reasonable thinking about the
abstract and non-corporeal aspects of divine entities.”
Christian writers typically expanded the definition to
include “the study of the will, nature, and attributes of
the God of revelation” as well as God’s “works in the
world, including creation, redemption, sanctification,
and the human duties and responses to his will” (von
Stuckrad, 2009, pp. 392-393). From at least the 17th
century on the Western definition of theology has been
further broadened to include things like practical theol-
ogy, “the academic study of Christian actions” (Maddox,
1991, p. 160), which could include the study of things
related to pastoral ministry, the life of the Church, and
the involvement of Christians in the world.
If this is Helminiak’s understanding of theology,
then it is clear that some versions of theistic psychol-
ogy would “cross the line” into theology as they include
ideas about divine action. However, it is also crucial to
note that according to this definition, “scientific” fields
like psychology of religion are constantly involved in
doing theology since they conduct scientific studies on
areas within the “magisterium” of theology. Many psy-
chological studies exist on issues in (1) pastoral ministry,
like the relationship between clergy and mental health
professionals; (2) church life, as in the effects of con-
gregational support on members; and (3) involvement,
such as the relationship between church membership
and volunteer service. Thus, a definition of theology as
it is broadly understood today offers no clear separation
between theological inquiry and some modern accepted
scientific practices.
Perhaps Helminiak would reject this traditional
definition of theology as too broad, and argue that we
should seek a more particularist definition. Others
would agree. For instance, Louth (2007) points out
that Orthodox writers would general reject a definition
of theology that is simply “writing about God” and
insist on a system of thought that is (1) faithful to the
Ecumenical Councils of the Christian Church, (2) has a
central place for the incarnation, sacrifice and resurrec-
tion of God in Jesus Christ, and (3) acknowledges that
apophatic limits of any statement we might make about
God. Such a system would be thoroughly Trinitarian in
nature. However, according to these standards, theistic
psychology is not theological because it contains an
understanding of God that is too thin. In this frame-
work, theism is simply a philosophical or metaphysical
position such as Stoicism or reductive naturalism. Thus
from this point of view a theistic psychology remains
safely outside the “magisterium” of theology.
The problems here suggest that Helminiak’s
critique fails in two important ways. First, he does not
articulate an understanding of theology that could sup-
port his claims of separation. Second, the radical ways
in which the boundary between theology and science
change as we alter the definition of “theology” sug-
gest that there is no transcendentally-given distinction
between theology and science. This is not too surpris-
ing given the fact that both fields share areas of interest
such as the nature of the human person and how we can
best care for others in need. Some writers like Bernard
Lonergan (a favorite of Helminiak) also make the point
that science and theology rely on similar processes of
insight, providing another potentially interesting link
(Budenholzer, 1984).
The meaning of “science”
Surprisingly, the Helminiak article analyzed by Reber
and Slife also contains no definition of science, and a
perusal of other works by the author does not reveal a
consistent view of what he means by the term. At least
two visions of science appear in his writings: a broader
conceptualization and a stricter positivist view. In his
broader understanding, science is “any methodological
pursuit of understanding--usually described in terms of
empirical observation, hypothesis, and verification--that
results in an explanatory account, open to further ex-
pansion and coherent with other realms of knowledge”
(1996a, p. 2). Theistic psychologists would clearly ar-
gue that if properly executed their approach qualifies as
science according to these standards. It allows for pro-
posing explanatory hypotheses, testing them empirically
and co-ordinating these results with findings not only in
psychology, but also in theology and the humanities.
If this broad definition does not support his
argument against theistic psychology, perhaps he really
means to advance some other understanding of science.
There are indications of this in other places where he
advocates for a “positivist viewpoint” of science (1996b,
pp. 33-34). Positivism would fit well with what he ar-
ticulates as a goal for his proposed science of spirituality:
“the exposition of the necessary and sufficient causal
conditions to account for a phenomenon such that the
accounting articulates a general ‘law’ relevant to every
instance of the phenomenon ... a single explanation that
accurately applies to diverse instances of spirituality”
(Helminiak, 2006, p. 203). However, a positivist and
reductive naturalist view of science such as this carries
with it severe problems. First, positivism has been thor-
oughly discredited as a philosophy of science, and schol-
ars have been unable to articulate a coherent, consist
view of reductive naturalism (Nelson, 2009, pp. 63-65;
Rea, 2002). Second, traditional positivism would reject
Helminiak’s own project of establishing a science of
spirituality based on consciousness, as they would argue
that information about the contents of consciousness is
not positively verifiable (cf. e.g., Schlick, 1949). Once
again, the plausible definitions do not support Helmin-
iak’s position.
The science-theology relationship
Another way of attempting to evaluate Helminiak’s
argument is to see what he thinks is a responsible
