Christian Psychology
29
does not distinguish objects as they exist in themselves
(objectivity) from representations of objects in the
mind (subjectivity)” (p. 11). If the subjective- objec-
tive distinction is transcended then what is left of the
naturalistic objectivist’s dismissals of theism as a suitable
worldview for psychology?
Assuming Bernstein (1983) and this strand of her-
meneutical perspectives are correct (whatever “correct-
ness” might mean on such an account), we would have
no non-arbitrary basis to deny theistic psychology entre
to contemporary psychology. Unfortunately, theists are
given a seat at such a table only by denying all those
seated there any claim to a
true
voice as the price of the
seating (Groothuis, 2000). This admission price is too
high. While Reber and Slife correctly strive against the
shackles that naturalism places on theism, Plantinga
(2013) sees “creative anti-realism” as an equally danger-
ous challenge for Christian theism. He notes
….creative anti-realism, with its accompanying
entourage of relativism and anticommitment, is
a dominating force in the humanities. Contem-
porary philosophy, for example, is overrun with
varieties of relativism and anti-realism. One widely
popular version of relativism is Richard Rorty’s no-
tion that truth is what
my
peers will let
me
get away
with saying (p. 14).
My concern is that the defence of theism in
psychology by Reber and Slife appears to be taking this
creative anti-realist trajectory as its major support. As
Plantinga (2013) has noted “Perennial naturalism and
creative anti-realism are related in an interesting man-
ner: the first vastly underestimates the place of human
beings in the universe, and the second vastly overes-
timates it” (n.p.). Christianity has most commonly
asserted the absolute truth of its vision of the world and
the Reber and Slife proposal appear at odds with this
conventional Christian view (Groothuis, 2000).
Even if it were not for these theologically motivat-
ed issues with the particular approach taken to defend
their case, there is another source of concern. Bernstein’s
analysis has not itself achieved an uncontroversial status
within philosophy except among a segment of the
discipline (Matusitz & Kramer, 2011). It is influential
in a significant strand of philosophical hermeneutics but
has not been without serious criticism even in that do-
main (Margolis, 1985; Norris, 1997). Further among
Gadamerian scholars, there are those who point out the
hasty representation of the “non-realist” approach to
hermeneutics as a de facto absolute of the hermeneutic
landscape is not warranted. Wachterhauser (2003) states
“unfortunately, there is a tendency both inside and
outside hermeneutically oriented philosophies to ignore
these differences and assume simply that all those who
insist on the inescapable nature of interpretation have
the same thing in mind” (p. 54). He argues for a realist
understanding of Gadamer’s hermeneutic.
It is beyond the scope of this brief response to pro-
vide a further analysis of the merits of this conception
of objectivity and subjectivity or the degree to which
Bernstein’s literary and then pragmatic “turns” succeed
in transcending these “dichotomies” without falling prey
to relativism. The
hermeneutic turn
has not won the day
in the philosophical community the way the epistemic
turn did leading into the Enlightenment. It is even
far less taken as apodictic in the social sciences among
whom Slife and Reber are attempting to win a place for
theism. The authors are resting this rather large part of
their case on a contested philosophical position that has
not yet effectively jettisoned alternative epistemological
or metaphysical paradigms in psychology. This strikes
me as a risky and unnecessary endeavour.
My own investigations of the Gadamerian tradi-
tion finds helpful resources there but only if interpreted
within a realist trajectory that still leaves open progress
and a telos of absolute truth as regulative ideal for
knowledge because such a perspective gives humble
deference to the mind and nature of God (Hathaway,
2002; Kuennning, 1997; Wachterhauser, 1994). The
ontological reality of God leaves no room for the onto-
logical dismissal of the subject-object distinction of the
Bernstein variety. God’s understanding of the world is
not merely an “interpretation”: it is absolute facticity. To
deny a subject-object distinction in such a context is to
deny the distinction between the creature and creator.
Once we grant that absolute knowledge exists albeit
fully only the mind of God then the question becomes
whether human knowledge can ever move closer to
it. While the finite cannot contain the infinite, as the
theologians have long claimed, God can providentially
structure the human mind so that real knowledge is
possible even within a hermeneutic model of under-
standing. The hermeneutic circle may be ubiquitous for
humans but it does not have to be vicious (Nash, 1982;
Wachterhauser, 2003).
Methodical naturalism & question begging
This brings me to my last point of tension with the case
made by our authors. Their treatment of methodologi-
cal naturalism needs further development. My own
reading of 19th century psychology suggests that the
turn to methodological naturalism happened in large
part because the pioneers of the “new psychology”
were looking for consensus generating mechanisms
that would allow them to address at least some of the
questions in philosophical and moral psychology more
effectively than the longstanding approaches that had
come from the humanities (Dewey, 1884; Kirkpatrick,
1895). This not only led to the attempt to emulate the
objective methods of the natural sciences but also lead
to demarcation of the field around those questions that
could be answered through the resulting investigatory
methods. The experimental tradition and radical behav-
iorism are perhaps the clearest forms of these disciplin-
ary impulses.
