Christian Psychology
39
Now, if we accept claims 1 and 2 then the conclu-
sion C seems well supported. The criticisms of theistic
psychology would be mistaken if they presuppose a
mistaken view about the two main world views.
I want to focus attention initially on the second
premise in this overall argument. To evaluate it we need
to be clear about two things. The first is what the con-
ception is that it is claimed the critics are committed to.
The second is what reason is being offered to suppose
that conception is mistaken. Once we are clear about
those two things we can try to work out whether any
mistake has been demonstrated in the conception.
The conception that is being targeted seems to
be this; there are two dominant world views. The first
is Naturalism (hereafter N) which claims that ‘only
natural events really matter, whether for theory, research
or practice’. (Reber and Slife, this issue, p. 4). The
second viewpoint is Theism (T) which says that ‘divine
involvement is a present, ongoing, and difference–mak-
ing activity.’ (Reber and Slife, this issue, p.5) According
to the conception N and T are separable conceptions,
and they can be ranked on the basis of comparing them
in respect of objectivity and subjectivity, the outcome
being that N is objective and T subjective.
This seems to be how R&S describe the two
viewpoints, but it is hard not to feel that talk of two
viewpoints is a bit misleading. The reason is that there
seems to be a third meta-viewpoint in the picture,
which is the one comparing the other two viewpoints.
Internal to the third viewpoint is the claim that N and
T are separable and that N is more objective than T.
Do R&S think that what I am calling the third meta-
viewpoint is simply N filled out? On the face of it the
meta-viewpoint is not identical to N, since N is not a
thesis about viewpoints at all. It is a thesis about ‘what
matters to theory’. So, I feel somewhat confused right at
the beginning about the structure of the frameworks.
Let us leave this puzzle aside and try to say why
R&S reject the view of N and T that their critics are
committed to. The answer emerges later. They endorse
what they call the
hermeneutic
view, deriving from Hei-
degger and Gadamer. What is this view? According to
R&S the hermeneutic view ‘does not distinguish objects
as they exist in themselves (objectively) from representa-
tions of objects in the mind (subjectivity).’ Rather, it
conceives of them [ie objects] ‘as meanings’. It follows,
according to R&S, that without the ‘dualism of subjects
and objects’ the ‘conventional view of worldview sepa-
rability collapses’. Further different viewpoints cannot
be ‘arranged hierarchically’ (quotations from Reber and
Slife, this issue, pp. 18-19).
Obviously the hermeneutic view that R&S endorse
raises a vast number of questions. I want to raise just a
few of them here.
1. As far as I can see in R&S’s paper no reasons
are offered to accept the hermeneutic view.
They report it as the view they accept, but
why someone not already convinced of it
should endorse it is not explained.
2. Although the hermeneutic view has serious
backers it is, I find, very hard to make much
sense of it. Central to it is (or seems to be)
the claim that there is no distinction between
objects as they are in themselves and how sub-
jects represent them. But such a distinction or
contrast seems both fundamental to how we
think of the world and not something we have
any option to reject. Thus, the moon seems
to be an object in space which exists quite
independently of human conceptions of it,
and which has a character independent of our
thought about it. I seem quite able to separate
the object that is the moon from thought
about it. Moreover, this contrast seems basic
to how we think about truth. We think of a
claim about the moon as true if that indepen-
dent object, the moon, is the way it is claimed
to be. We cannot uproot the distinction
between object and thought. These contrasts
seem to be ones the hermeneutic view rejects
but which count as simply obvious to us.
3. One theme in the account is that the ‘con-
ventional notion of worldview separabil-
ity collapses’ (Reber and Slife, this issue, p.
19). What do R&S mean by separability of
worldviews? Is separability of world view the
idea that one can hold one without holding
the other? If that is what it means then since
some people accept N without T and some
accept T without N it cannot be denied that
they are separable, and the hermeneutic view
surely cannot deny that they are separable
in that sense. That condition for comparing
them, it seems to me, cannot be queried. If
they mean that there is some conceptual link
between the views then something along those
lines may be right. But what is the conceptual
link? It seems that N employs the concept
of the natural realm and that concept is also
employed in the elucidation of the central
claim in T that there is a god, namely that god
is something which is supernatural. So there is
conceptual sharing between the views. How-
ever, this form of connexion seems not to have
any significant implications. It needs adding
too that when R&S support the inseparability
thesis they often mention historical links be-
tween religion and science. For example, they
say that religious beliefs prompted scientists in
the Middle Ages (Reber and Slife, this issue,
p. 19). This is no doubt true, but it simply
amounts to there having been influence
between science and religion, and no more
amounts to support for an inseparability thesis
