Christian Psychology
40
than the fact that tobacco has influenced dis-
ease shows we cannot separate tobacco from
disease.
4. It seems to be part of R&S’s view that if in
accordance with the hermeneutic view we
abandon the distinction between ‘objectivity
and subjectivity’ we thereby abandon any idea
that one viewpoint can be ranked as superior
to another. For them the important applica-
tion of this idea is that the N-view cannot be
ranked as superior to the T-view. But how far
are they prepared to hold this consequence? In
particular, do they hold that the hermeneutic
view itself is not superior to the anti-herme-
neutic view? This question seems difficult for
them. If they think that the hermeneutic view
is superior to its denial then the hermeneutic
view cannot imply the no-superiority thesis. If
they hold that it does imply the no-superiority
view they must abandon their idea that the
hermeneutic view is correct as compared to its
denial, and then they lose the implications it
generates for them.
5. One final thought is this. Suppose we accept
the hermeneutic view and conclude that
viewpoints (whatever they are exactly) cannot
be ranked, that still leaves practitioners within
a discipline with the task of settling the ap-
propriate methodology for their activity. For
example, someone whose trade is building
bridges still needs to have a view on how to
decide how it should be built. Questions of
this sort are inescapable once one is engaged
in such a task. Now, no general philosophical
view can reveal that all methods are equally
good. No bridge builder could suppose that
asking the Delphic oracle what type of steel
to use is a good method. But this means, I
suggest, that no philosophical argument can
really show that there are not good as opposed
to bad, superior as opposed to inferior, meth-
ods for a science to adopt. This means, that
no general philosophical argument can really
show that if practitioners of modern psychol-
ogy think they can discern considerations that
count against theistic theories then they have
to be wrong or unjustified in that attitude.
My proposal, then, is that this leaves R&S with
two possible options to defend theistic psychology. The
first is the first one I gave above, of supporting particu-
lar psychological theories which they count as theistic
along the lines that psychologists will find acceptable.
The second is to uproot the received methodologies of
current psychology showing why they are bad given
the concerns and understanding of method that the
discipline of psychology has. In resorting to a highly
speculative philosophical argument R&S seem to have
chosen a route that does not bear on the methodologi-
cal issues that should concern them.
Paul F. Snowdon
is Grote Professor of Mind and Logic,
University College London. His research interests are
the Philosophy of Mind and Action, the nature of
persons, perception, and the history of Philosophy. He
has published a series of papers about these matters, and
will shortly be publishing, with OUP, a book on persons
entitled
Persons, Animals, Ourselves
, arguing that we are,
fundamentally, animals, and also a collection of papers
on perception, entitled
Essays on Perceptual Experience.
Correspondence concerning this comment should be
addressed to Paul F. Snowdon, Department of Philoso-
phy, UCL, Gower St., London, WC1E 6BT. Email:
Reference
Helminiak, D. A. (2010). “Theistic Psychology and Psy-
chotherapy”: A Theological and Scientific Critique.
Zygon, 45(1)
, 47 – 74.
Note
1
I am very grateful to Arthur Schipper for discussion
which has influenced my conception of these issues.
Religion versus Science—The Current Dilemma:
A Reply to the “Reply to the Critics” of the “Theistic
Psychologists”
1
Daniel A. Helminiak
University of West Georgia
I reply again to the “theistic psychologists,” puzzled that
they ignore my, their “exemplar critic’s,” substantive criti-
cism. First, I note new but ultimately incoherent themes
in their ongoing speculation. Second, I focus the key issue:
their undefined insistence on routine divine intervention
and an idiosyncratic notion of creation. Third, for reasons
of theoretical incoherence and verbal ambiguity, I fault
their central argument, a contrived opposition between
“naturalism” and “theism” as a supposed parallel to “ob-
jectivity” and “subjectivity.” Fourth, I criticize their use of
“hermeneutical theory” to cover over differences between
incompatible worldviews, noting that the theory itself is
wanting in criteria for adjudicating conflicting construc-
tions of meaning. To clarify my position throughout and to
make a positive contribution, I intimate an alternative ap-
proach, based on the thought of Bernard Lonergan, for the
integration of theology and science. Finally, I offer broad
observations, faulting the oxymoronic and pre-scientifically
conceived project of “theistic psychology” in whatever
version and calling, instead, for a genuine psychological
effort toward a non-theistic (not atheistic) psychology of
spirituality.
Keywords: faith, reason; spirituality, naturalistic; Loner-
