Christian Psychology
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may not have defined these conceptions to their liking,
which is the focus of the next section wherein we ques-
tion whether Collicutt and Snowdon’s expectations for a
definition of theism and a theistic approach to psychol-
ogy are reasonable and naturalistic.
Did We Define a Theistic Approach to Psychology?
Within the first few pages of our initial article we
dedicated a full paragraph to our definition of theism.
Stating this definition as clearly as possible and referenc-
ing the work of Ian Barbour (1997) to show that our
definition is not an idiosyncratic one, we defined theism
as “the worldview that a God (or Gods) is actively
and currently engaged with and makes a meaningful
difference in the practical world” (Reber & Slife, p. 6).
We then distinguished theism from deism and dual-
ism to show how theism differs from philosophical and
theological conceptualizations of divinity in which God
is not actively and currently involved in the world. Our
theistic definition of a participatory, difference-making
God is reiterated in several subsequent passages of the
paper.
We then clarified or “operationalized” this defini-
tion when we discussed our god attachment research.
In the review of that research we showed how a theistic
worldview generates unique hypotheses that can be
investigated using the scientific method. We also
discussed how a theistic approach to psychology may
require a broadening of psychologists’ conceptualization
of science to include a variety of methods that may use-
fully illuminate appropriate meanings of the phenom-
ena being investigated. In these ways we explicated
our definition of a theistic approach to psychology, and
did so with some detail. Additionally, in the event that
readers wanted more details about our definition, we
cited no fewer than 12 published articles that also define
theism and describe a theistic approach to psychology.
The majority of the commentators gave no indica-
tion that they found our definitions of theism and a
theistic approach lacking. On the contrary, Freeman
quotes our definition of theism and then, clearly under-
standing its meaning, suggests one of its major implica-
tions for psychology, which is that “if divine activity
truly makes a difference in the world, then insofar as
psychology remains steadfastly committed to natural-
ism, it cannot help but remain incomplete – indeed,
one might add, insufficiently
scientific
” (p. 22). Though
Freeman is not an advocate of theistic psychology, he
clearly understands our definition of it and its radical
implications for contemporary scientific psychology.
Hathaway, Johnson, and Nelson also show no signs
of confusion regarding our definition of theism and a
theistic approach to psychology. Even Helminiak, our
exemplar critic recognizes that our definition of theism
assumes “routine divine intervention“ (p. 40). He
interprets the meanings of each of these three terms in a
conventional naturalistic sense, as we will show later on,
but he does understand that for theists god is involved
in the world in an ongoing way.
What did Collicutt and Snowdon Expect?
In Collicutt’s opening paragraph she asserts that our
paper lacked a clear definition of a theistic approach to
psychology. Two sentences later, she gives a clue about
what kind of definition she would find acceptable, and
it is one in which we “spell out in what way or in what
sense the divine agent(s) might act” (p. 21). In other
words, she wants an explication of the mechanism of
God’s action in the world, what she calls “the proximal
cause of behavior” (ibid). Specifically, she wants to
know if we would explain God and the mechanism of
his action in terms of an “external stimulus,” an “in-
trapsychic force,” a “cognitive module,” or “the action
of subatomic particles that form part of human brain
chemistry” (ibid). As is the case with many social sci-
entists (e.g., Elster, 1989; Hedstrom & Yikoski, 2010;
Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000), it appears that
Collicutt expected a definition that at least proposes a
naturalistic causal mechanism through which divinity
acts in the world. We want to ask two questions of this
expectation here: Is it reasonable and is it naturalistic?
Is this expectation reasonable?
We might first
ask, is it a reasonable expectation of any psychologi-
cal theory? Psychology is rife with theories that fail to
specify causal mechanisms (Gantt, Melling, & Reber,
2012; Gantt, Reber, & Hyde, 2013), and this has been
the case for a long time. Indeed, since Descartes first
mistakenly proposed the pineal gland as the location of
interaction between mind and body in the 16th Cen-
tury, philosophers and then psychologists have failed
to identify a mechanism that explains the relationship
between bodily processes like the firing of neurons and
mental activities like thinking. Similarly, from the
time of Darwin up to evolutionary psychology today,
the cognitive mechanisms that are inherited from our
ancestors, coded into our genes, and manifested in our
behaviors have yet to be “spelled out” (Collicutt, p.
21). In truth, few psychologists can spell out how the
constructs of their theories “might act” (ibid), which
is why psychologists designate psychological
theories
as
theories, not facts.
Yet, although the specific mechanisms that explain
many important psychological phenomena have eluded
psychologists for centuries it has not stymied the
advancement of psychological knowledge. The theories
of neuropsychology, for instance, have served the
discipline quite well despite the absence of a specified
mechanism that explains how brain activity and mental
processes interact. Skinner’s behaviorism made signifi-
cant advances in the field of learning and he explicitly
refused to speculate about the specific mechanisms
that might explain operant conditioning (Rychlak,
1981). Similarly, the program of theistic psychological
research that we have initiated has already contributed
REBER AND SLIFE
