Christian Psychology
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miracle. Intervention does not have to be understood
within a framework of a law-governed natural world,
but in terms of divine redemption of the fallen from
sin through mercy and forgiveness. For the Christian
theist, the intervention of God’s mercy and redemptive
power upon our sinfulness has no necessary relation to
the lawfulness of natural processes (Berkouwer, 1952).
It is a matter of the heart and will, not the causal laws
of nature. If we repent, God’s mercy intervenes upon
justice, he forgets our sins, and saves us from misery and
hell because he loves us. The miracle of God’s involve-
ment, in this theistic sense, is one of his grace, mercy,
forgiveness, and redemption, not one of suspending or
violating natural laws, and it is this miracle of grace and
redemption that constitutes a major “aspect of human
experience” (American Psychological Association, 2014,
line 2) for theists that we think is worthy of theistic
psychological research.
Berkouwer (1952) summarizes this theistic con-
ceptualization of miracle and shows its contrast with
the naturalistically accommodated conceptualization of
miracle this way:
A miracle is not an abnormal or unnatural occur-
rence presupposing the normality of nature, but a
redeeming reinstatement of the normality of the
world and life through the new dominion of God,
which stands antithetically against the kingdom of
this world. Miracles are not part of a supernatural
order which intrudes upon an absolutized “natu-
ral” order of things, thereupon creating a tension
between miracles and nature. They reveal the
kingdom of God in opposition to the devil and his
dominion....This is why the miraculous power of
the kingdom is not directed contra naturam but
contra peccatum and against the horrible conse-
quences of sin” (p. 211).
We find it interesting that Helminiak never showed any
consideration of the possibility that it was this most
important of theistic conceptions of miracle that we
addressed in our initial article. In his writing, it would
appear that there is only one framework for understand-
ing miracles and other theistic phenomena, and that is a
conventional framework that is accommodated to natu-
ralism. While we recognize this framework’s influence
on one possible conceptualization of miracles, and we
are aware that many theists conceptualize certain kinds
of miracles in this way, it is not the only conceptualiza-
tion available. In fact, as Berkouwer (1952) points out,
it is not the most important conceptualization for the-
ists at all, for whom fallenness and sin, not natural laws,
frame their understanding of a world in which God’s
redemptive intervention takes place and makes the most
meaningful difference.
Helminiak’s omission of prominent theistic
conceptualizations of theistic experiences as important
as the miracles of forgiveness, redemption, and grace is
indicative of the implicit prejudice toward theism that
pervades the discipline (Slife & Reber, 2009). It also
indicates the need for a theistic approach to psychology
in which research is guided by a theistic worldview that
is genuinely open to all the experiences and meanings
that pertain to faith. We believe it is precisely because
theism and naturalism are comparable in their dialectic
relationship that these prejudices and accommodations
can be identified and taken into account. On the other
hand, if theism and naturalism were seen as separate,
incomparable magisteria we would miss the ways in
which they have affected each other, changed mean-
ings, and added new definitions. Like Helminiak, we
might also fail to appreciate their uniquenesses, which
are often only illuminated by the light of their relational
contrasts.
Worldview Superiority
One of the main arguments we explicated in our initial
article was that the worldviews of naturalism and theism
are related hierarchically by the conventional psycholo-
gist, with naturalism in the ascendant position due to its
presumed greater objectivity, and theism in the descen-
dant position because it is viewed by the conventionalist
as being riddled with the subjective biases of personal
opinion and metaphysical speculation. Several themes
of worldview superiority emerged in the comments
that warrant brief discussion here. First, we address the
theme of positivism, which some commentators view
as a part of psychology’s history and others see as alive
and well in its present. Then, we discuss our focus on
meaning, noting that some commentators continue to
frame meaning within the subjectivity/objectivity dual-
ism we challenged in our article. Finally, we respond
to a theme raised in several comments, which questions
whether there might be a kind of superiority at play in
the alternative framing of worldviews that we described
in our original article.
Positivism
As with previously discussed themes, our commentators
range across a variety of responses to our assertion that a
kind of positivism based on the assumption of sub-
jectivity/objectivity dualism informs a hierarchical ar-
rangement of the worldviews of naturalism and theism.
Collicutt, for example, denies the pervasiveness of this
superiority feature of the conventional view by arguing
that the positivism that embraced this objective/subjec-
tive dualistic superiority in psychology was unique to
“the USA in the 1960s and 70s” (p. 21), and a focus
on this limited manifestation of positivistic superiority
“doesn’t do justice to the current field across the world”
(ibid). Similarly, Helminiak asserts that logical positiv-
ism is “now unanimously and completely discredited”
(p. 46) by scientists.
Like Collicutt and Helminiak, Nelson, who has
written extensively on positivism in psychology (e.g.,
REBER AND SLIFE
