Christian Psychology
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we advocate a theistic approach to psychology that
can illuminate meanings that a naturalistic psychol-
ogy cannot. However, this is not a retreat on truth, as
Hathaway suggests, or the relativism that concerns Hel-
miniak. The meanings that are disclosed in naturalistic
and theistic research do help to advance psychological
knowledge. We have found, for example, that a person’s
childhood experiences with parents and their personal
experiences of God are both important, independent
predictors of God attachment that account for a larger
percentage of the variance in god attachment together
than either one can do alone.
Hermeneutic Superiority?
In light of our discussion on meaning, we can better
understand Snowdon’s questions about whether we are
claiming the superiority of our hermeneutic approach to
the conventional view or whether we are trying to take
a “no-superiority view” (p. 40). In response to Snowdon
we would first state that we agree with Johnson’s com-
ment that although claims of superiority might be inevi-
table, they do not have to be unreflective and dogmatic.
Johnson acknowledges a “totalizing tendency” (p. 32)
in human beings, but he argues through the example of
Christianity’s history that it is possible to become more
aware of our own tendencies toward coercive discourse
and develop a “growing non-totalizing flexibility” (p.
32) in its place. As we argued in our initial paper, we
think the adherents of any worldview can and should
reflect upon the untested presuppositions that inform
their worldview, recognize the biases that ensue, and
evaluate the implications of those biases on the relation-
ship of that worldview to other worldviews. Thus,
along with Johnson, we do not see the inevitability of
superiority claims as necessarily entailing dogmatism
about those claims. There are different ways to claim
superiority, including tentative, reflective ways that
Snowdon may not have considered when he raised this
question.
The second point we would make about our
perspective on superiority is that we do not advocate an
abstract, once and for all worldview superiority. On the
contrary, we believe the “non-totalizing flexibility” (p.
32) Johnson advocates is achieved only if worldviews
and the phenomena they address are examined within
the contexts in which they are situated. Indeed, as we
argued throughout the initial article, the superiority
of a given worldview in addressing any psychological
phenomenon, hinges upon its ability to illuminate the
constrained meaning of that phenomenon and advance
psychological knowledge about it. Freeman summa-
rized our position on this second point quite clearly,
which is:
1) that ‘superiority’ can be bi-directional, 2) that
it is not a superiority for all time but, as above, is
contextually-specific, and 3) that the very positing
of such superiority is dependent upon some refer-
ence to the particular phenomena being considered
– acknowledging, once again, that these phenom-
ena are always already suffused with the prejudices
one inevitably brings to them (p. 25).
Thus, we reply to Snowdon’s question about
whether we might accept a “no-superiority view” (p. 40)
with a strong rejection of the abstract superiority view
he is suggesting and a clear acceptance of a contextual
superiority view, as outlined by Freeman and described
in our initial article.
We believe a theistic approach to psychology may
be superior to a naturalistic approach in illuminating
certain features of some psychological phenomena,
while a naturalistic approach may be superior in illumi-
nating other features. Indeed, we think they can also be
superior in illuminating aspects of the other worldview
that are concealed from its own view. However, we will
only know the extent to which a theistic or naturalis-
tic approach is superior in this contextual sense if we
allow both approaches the space and time to test their
theories and critically examine their relationship to each
other. Similarly, we will only know the strengths of
critical hermeneutic realism as an alternative frame to
the conventional view if we take a critically reflective,
contextual approach to it. We did not introduce this
hermeneutic frame as a dogmatic, abstract truth, but as
one possible alternative to the conventional view. This
alternative, like any view, needs ongoing critical reflec-
tion and careful examination of its assumptions and
its implications for the relationship between a theistic
approach to psychology and a naturalistic approach.
We see the articles in this issue as a crucial step in that
reflective, relational evaluation.
Conclusion
We wrote our paper for this special issue to clear some
conceptual space so that a fruitful and fair dialog about
the prospect of a theistic approach to psychology could
take place. This entailed removing some of the modern-
ist debris that continues to occupy that conceptual
space, such as the residues of positivism and the subjec-
tivity/objectivity dualism that pervade psychology and
facilitate the separation and hierarchical arrangement of
worldviews. While we were pleased that several of the
comments responded to our paper at that level of analy-
sis, we were concerned that others wanted us to address
other more advanced issues and themes that can only be
addressed once the parameters of the dialog are adjusted
to allow for an alternative framework of worldview
relations to the conventional view. Without that adjust-
ment, advocates of a theistic approach to psychology
will have to answer to challenges and questions that are
premature, if not unfairly biased toward the naturalistic
worldview. A theistic approach to psychology will never
get a fair hearing and the potential contributions of this
approach to the advancement of psychological knowl-
edge will never be realized.
A REPLY TO THE COMMENTS
